<!DOCTYPE html><HTML lang="en"> <head> <meta charset="utf-8"> <link href="../../TheosStyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="../../TT_ICO.png" /> <title>Note: Animadversions - Haldane - Naturalism and the Mind (Theo Todman's Web Page)</title> </head><body> <a name="Top"></a> <h1>Theo Todman's Web Page - Notes Pages</h1><hr><h2>Animadversions</h2><h3>Haldane - Naturalism and the Mind</h3><p class = "Centered">(Text as at 18/12/2010 19:58:05)<br><br>(For earlier versions of this Note, <a href="#TableOfPreviousVersions">see the table at the end</a>)</p><hr> <P><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><ol type="1"><li>Haldane had an extensive hand-out (<a name="2"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15932.htm">Haldane (John) - Naturalism and Mind</A>") but didn t stick to it, being deflected by the (rather unsurprising) things <a name="1"></a><A HREF = "../Notes_9/Notes_916.htm">Papineau</A><SUP>1</SUP> had to say (in <a name="3"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15931.htm">Papineau (David) - The Argument for Naturalism about the Mind</A>"). </li><li>Papineau s arguments belong to a <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_917_2">family</A></U><SUB>2</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_917_2"></A> (from Donald Davidson, David Lewis, and so on). Mind makes a difference, but both cause and effect are physical. Haldane thinks that the argument is less straightforward than it might seem.</li><li>Scientific Explanation is a  privileged route to knowledge.</li><li>The  integral unity of substances . Effects flow from the <U>nature</U> of things  which are not just lumps of stuff. </li><li>The rejection of the supernatural  but <U>another</U> Haldane  an atheist  claimed that the world is stranger than we <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_917_3">can</A></U><SUB>3</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_917_3"></A> think. </li><li>In contemporary usage <I>supernatural</I> is really <I><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_917_4">praeternatural</A></U><SUB>4</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_917_4"></A></I>  the miraculous  ie. beyond the ordinary powers of substances. Strictly, <I>supernatural</I> is the operation of grace. </li><li>If we depart from physicalism, does this mean that we need to view the mind in praeternaturalist terms? <U>No</U>.</li><li>There are three views of metaphysics:- <ul type="disc"><li>Metaphysics as <U>science</U> - Quine  scientism. </li><li>Metaphysics as a priori etc. This view is deflationary about ontology. Does whatever we talk about in a regulated and well-ordered manner exist? If so, then what we <U>mean</U> by saying that numbers exist is that there exists a well-ordered discourse that involves them. For realism about minds, we need more than just <U>talk</U> about them  we need them to make a difference. </li><li><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_917_5">Third</A></U><SUB>5</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_917_5"></A> option  not discussed? </li></ul></li><li><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_917_6">Arguments</A></U><SUB>6</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_917_6"></A> against physicalism in the philosophy of mind:- <ul type="disc"><li>a. <B>Sensibility</B>: Eg. consciousness. <U>Not</U> persuasive. </li><li>b. <B>Intelligibility</B>: Modality, etc. </li></ul></li><li>Substances (eg. water) are identified by their causal powers  whether active (abilities) or passive (liabilities). Eg. Acid has the ability to dissolve. </li><li>Haldane is not impressed by the arguments from consciousness (as arguments against physicalism). It s not obvious that consciousness isn t part of the physical world. It s  isomorphic to the physical world  can turn up the volume. Consciousness is just a mode of receptivity to the physical. </li><li><B>Aquinas</B>: unpack. We have powers of categorisation into kinds. <U>Universals</U> are not material. There s no such thing as the organ of thought. Deliberation is not over particulars (= actuals) but over possibles. </li><li>To be <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_917_7">continued</A></U><SUB>7</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_917_7"></A>?</li></ol></P> <FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><HR><h3 class = "Left">In-Page Footnotes:</h3><a name="On-Page_Link_917_2"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_917_2"><B>Footnote 2</B></A></U>: Track down the references in these philosophers.<a name="On-Page_Link_917_3"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_917_3"><B>Footnote 3</B></A></U>: According to Wikipedia (<a name="W2038W"></a><A HREF = "https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Arthur_Eddington" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>),  Though sometimes attributed to Eddington without citation, this seems to be derived from a statement by J. B. S. Haldane (<a name="W2039W"></a><A HREF = "https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/J._B._S._Haldane" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>) in <I>Possible Worlds and Other Papers</I> (1927), p. 286: <B>The Universe is not only queerer than we suppose, but queerer than we can suppose</B>. <a name="On-Page_Link_917_4"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_917_4"><B>Footnote 4</B></A></U>: See, for instance, <a name="W2040W"></a><A HREF = "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Preternatural" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>. <a name="On-Page_Link_917_5"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_917_5"><B>Footnote 5</B></A></U>: The hand-out has:- <ol type="1"><li>Metaphysics as science</li><li>Metaphysics as prior to and independent of empirical knowledge </li><li>Metaphysics as interpretative of empirical and other knowledge. </li></ol><a name="On-Page_Link_917_6"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_917_6"><B>Footnote 6</B></A></U>: Haldane had a (non-distributed!) hand-out with 20 arguments against physicalism. <a name="On-Page_Link_917_7"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_917_7"><B>Footnote 7</B></A></U>: My notes run out at this point, but don t indicate that there was more said  they run straight on to the Q&As. I ve no idea what the point of Haldane s talk was.</center><br> <br><hr><h3 class = "Left">Printable Versions:</h3> <UL><li>Follow (<A Href="Notes_Print/NotesPrint_917_0_P_R.htm" TARGET = "_top">this link</A>) for level 0 (with reading list), and </li><li>Follow (<A Href="Notes_Print/NotesPrint_917_1_P.htm" TARGET = "_top">this link</A>) for level 1.</li></UL> <a name="TableOfPreviousVersions"></a><BR><HR><h3 class= "Left">Previous Version of this Note:</h3> <TABLE class = "ReadingList" WIDTH=700> <TR><TD WIDTH="20%" class = "BridgeCenter"><strong>Date</strong></TD> <TD WIDTH="10%" class = "BridgeRight"><strong>Length</strong></TD> <TD WIDTH="70%" class = "BridgeLeft"><strong>Title</strong></TD></TR> <TR><TD class = "BridgeCenter">18/06/2010 14:54:14</TD> <TD class = "BridgeRight">16</TD> <TD class = "BridgeLeft"><A HREF = "Notes_917_40347621.htm">Haldane - Naturalism and the Mind</A></TD></TR> </TABLE> <BR><HR><BR><CENTER><TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950><TR> <TH WIDTH="25%">Note last updated</TH> <TH WIDTH="50%">Reading List for this Topic</TH> <TH WIDTH="25%">Parent Topic</TH></TR> <TR><TD WIDTH="25%">18/12/2010 19:58:05</TD> <TD WIDTH="50%">None available</TD> <TD WIDTH="25%"><A href ="../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_913.htm">Heythrop - Religion and Naturalism Conference</A></TD></TR> </TABLE></center> <hr><h3>Summary of Note Links from this Page</h3> <CENTER> <TABLE Class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <TR> <td bgcolor="#b3ffb3" WIDTH="20%"><A href = "../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_916.htm"><span title="High Quality">Papineau - Naturalism and the Mind</span></A></TD> <TD WIDTH="20%">&nbsp;</TD> <TD WIDTH="20%">&nbsp;</TD> <TD WIDTH="20%">&nbsp;</TD> <TD WIDTH="20%">&nbsp;</TD> </TR> </TABLE> </CENTER> <P class = "Centered">To access information, click on one of the links in the table above.</P> <BR><HR><BR><h3>Summary of Note Links to this Page</h3> <CENTER> <TABLE Class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <TR> <td bgcolor="#b3ffb3" WIDTH="20%"><A href = "../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_913.htm#5"><span title="High Quality">Heythrop - Religion and Naturalism Conference</span></A></TD> <td bgcolor="#b3ffb3" WIDTH="20%"><A href = "../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_922.htm#2"><span title="High Quality">Papineau & Haldane - Naturalism and the Mind - Q&As</span></A></TD> <td bgcolor="#e6ecff" WIDTH="20%"><A href = "../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm#10"><span title="Plug Note - With Reading List">Universals</span></A></TD> <TD WIDTH="20%">&nbsp;</TD> <TD WIDTH="20%">&nbsp;</TD> </TR> </TABLE> </CENTER> <P class = "Centered">To access information, click on one of the links in the table above.</P> <br><hr><br><CENTER> <h3>Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note</h3> <TABLE class = "ReadingList" WIDTH=950> <TD WIDTH="25%" class = "BridgeLeft"><B><B>Author</B></B></TD> <TD WIDTH="45%" class = "BridgeLeft"><B><B>Title</B></B></TD> <TD WIDTH="10%" class = "BridgeLeft"><B><B>Medium</B></B></TD> <TD WIDTH="15%" class = "BridgeLeft"><B>Extra Links</B></TD> <TD WIDTH="5%" class = "BridgeCenter"><B><B>Read?</B></B></TD> <TR> <TD WIDTH="25%" class = "BridgeLeft">Todman (Theo)</TD> <TD WIDTH="45%" class = "BridgeLeft">Thesis - Universals</TD> <TD WIDTH="10%" class = "BridgeLeft"><A HREF="../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19970.htm#11">Paper</A> <img src="../../asterisk_yellow.png"alt="Medium Quality Abstract" Title="Medium Quality"></TD> <TD WIDTH="15%" class = "BridgeLeft">&nbsp;</TD> <TD WIDTH="5%" class = "BridgeCenter">Yes</TD> </TR> </TABLE></center> <CENTER> <br><hr><br><h3>References & Reading List</h3> <TABLE class = "ReadingList" WIDTH=950> <TD WIDTH="15%" class = "BridgeLeft"><B>Author</B></TD> <TD WIDTH="25%" class = "BridgeLeft"><B>Title</B></TD> <TD WIDTH="20%" class = "BridgeLeft"><B>Medium</B></TD> <TD WIDTH="35%" class = "BridgeLeft"><B>Source</B></TD> <TD WIDTH="5%" class = "BridgeCenter"><B>Read?</B></TD> <TR> <TD WIDTH="15%" class = "BridgeLeft">Haldane (John)</TD> <TD WIDTH="25%" class = "BridgeLeft">Naturalism and Mind</TD> <TD WIDTH="20%" class = "BridgeLeft"><A HREF="../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15932.htm">Paper - Cited</A> <img src="../../accept.png"alt="High Quality Abstract" Title=""></TD> <TD WIDTH="35%" class = "BridgeLeft">Religion and Naturalism, Heythrop College, 12 July 2010</TD> <TD WIDTH="5%" class = "BridgeCenter">Yes</TD> </TR> </TABLE> </CENTER> <a name="ColourConventions"></a><br><hr><br><h3 class = "Left">Text Colour Conventions</h3><OL TYPE="1"><li><FONT COLOR = "000000">Black</FONT>: Printable Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018</li><li><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Blue</FONT>: Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018</li></OL><BR> <center><BR><HR><BR><TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950><TR><TD WIDTH="30%">&copy; Theo Todman, June 2007 - August 2018.</TD><TD WIDTH="40%">Please address any comments on this page to <A HREF="mailto:theo@theotodman.com">theo@theotodman.com</A>.</TD><TD WIDTH="30%">File output: <time datetime="2018-08-06T09:50" pubdate>06/08/2018 09:50:59</time> <br><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1010.htm">Website Maintenance Dashboard</A></TD></TR><TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="#Top">Return to Top of this Page</A></TD><TD WIDTH="40%"><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1140.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page</A></TD><TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="../../index.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Home Page</A></TD></TR></TABLE></CENTER><HR></BODY></HTML>