<!DOCTYPE html><HTML lang="en"> <head> <meta charset="utf-8"> <link href="../../TheosStyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="../../TT_ICO.png" /> <title>Note: Animadversions - Papineau & Haldane - Naturalism and the Mind - Q&As (Theo Todman's Web Page)</title> </head><body> <a name="Top"></a> <h1>Theo Todman's Web Page - Notes Pages</h1><hr><h2>Animadversions</h2><h3>Papineau & Haldane - Naturalism and the Mind - Q&As</h3><p class = "Centered">(Text as at 21/04/2018 20:05:17)<br><br>(For earlier versions of this Note, <a href="#TableOfPreviousVersions">see the table at the end</a>)</p><hr> <P><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><ol type="1"><li>This was a follow-up <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_922_1">session</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_922_1"></A> to <a name="1"></a><A HREF = "../Notes_9/Notes_916.htm">Papineau</A><SUP>2</SUP> and <a name="2"></a><A HREF = "../Notes_9/Notes_917.htm">Haldane</A><SUP>3</SUP>. </li><li><B>John Cottingham</B>: chaired the Session, and started off with the question:-  How can value, meaning and concepts be reduced to the firings of neurons? Thomistic arguments  the power to engage with abstract structures requires the use of the brain (it lights up) but can we conclude that this is all there is to cognition? </li><li><B>David Papineau</B>: He s not proposing a crude reductionism. An analogy: a cricket-ball breaking a window. We can t reduce the cricket-ball to molecular structures, but the cricket-ball isn t anything over and above its molecules. We have a constitution or <a name="3"></a><A HREF = "../Notes_12/Notes_1263.htm">supervenience</A><SUP>4</SUP> relation. </li><li>The traditional religious view is that we are  informed bodies  which is non-Cartesian. </li><li>Not all explanations are physical, even though all things are physical. </li><li>What we now know is cognitive activity subserving neural activity, but this is far from physicalism. </li><li> This is a piece of gold links together sensibility and intellect. </li><li>Response to David Papineau: <ul type="disc"><li>Premise (3)  causal exclusion and <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_922_5">closure</A></U><SUB>5</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_922_5"></A>: what about Suarez and Divine concurrence? God and I are both causes of any activity. </li><li>Are field-effects physical? </li><li>There s an ambiguity about causal closure <BR>&rarr; too weak, and we have emergentism<BR>&rarr; too strong, and it sounds a priori</li><li>Two partial causes: Suarez  different orders of causality  take writing: has both agent-centric and instrumental causes. </li><li>This is not Eccles-style slipping-in of  mental causes in the physical chain. </li><li>Form and matter: signing one s name  can describe the process at different levels. </li></ul></li><li>Papineau isn t upset by Strawson s panpsychism. The same as neutral <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_922_6">monism</A></U><SUB>6</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_922_6"></A>. </li><li>Haldane s  20 objections to physicalism effectively reduce to one  epiphenomenalism. </li><li>Emergentism  do we get ontologically new stuff, or is it just that structures and complexity require a new vocabulary? </li></ol></P> <FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><HR><h3 class = "Left">In-Page Footnotes:</h3><a name="On-Page_Link_922_1"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_922_1"><B>Footnote 1</B></A></U>: My notes are not very full, and my memory of the session is now substantially gone. So, this write-up gives a flavour only.<a name="On-Page_Link_922_5"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_922_5"><B>Footnote 5</B></A></U>:  Premise 3: The physical effects of conscious causes are not all overdetermined.  <a name="On-Page_Link_922_6"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_922_6"><B>Footnote 6</B></A></U>: Isn t one of these due to Strawson-fils, and the other dues to Strawson-pere? </center><br> <br><hr><h3 class = "Left">Printable Versions:</h3> <UL><li>Follow (<A Href="Notes_Print/NotesPrint_922_0_P_R.htm" TARGET = "_top">this link</A>) for level 0 (with reading list), and </li><li>Follow (<A Href="Notes_Print/NotesPrint_922_1_P.htm" TARGET = "_top">this link</A>) for level 1.</li></UL> <a name="TableOfPreviousVersions"></a><BR><HR><h3 class= "Left">Table of the Previous 2 Versions of this Note:</h3> <TABLE class = "ReadingList" WIDTH=700> <TR><TD WIDTH="20%" class = "BridgeCenter"><strong>Date</strong></TD> <TD WIDTH="10%" class = "BridgeRight"><strong>Length</strong></TD> <TD WIDTH="70%" class = "BridgeLeft"><strong>Title</strong></TD></TR> <TR><TD class = "BridgeCenter">18/12/2010 19:58:05</TD> <TD class = "BridgeRight">2278</TD> <TD class = "BridgeLeft"><A HREF = "Notes_922_40530832.htm">Papineau & Haldane - Naturalism and the Mind - Q&As</A></TD></TR> <TR><TD class = "BridgeCenter">20/06/2010 10:10:34</TD> <TD class = "BridgeRight">16</TD> <TD class = "BridgeLeft"><A HREF = "Notes_922_40349424.htm">Papineau & Haldane - Naturalism and the Mind - Q&As</A></TD></TR> </TABLE> <BR><HR><BR><CENTER><TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950><TR> <TH WIDTH="25%">Note last updated</TH> <TH WIDTH="50%">Reading List for this Topic</TH> <TH WIDTH="25%">Parent Topic</TH></TR> <TR><TD WIDTH="25%">21/04/2018 20:05:17</TD> <TD WIDTH="50%">None available</TD> <TD WIDTH="25%"><A href ="../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_913.htm">Heythrop - Religion and Naturalism Conference</A></TD></TR> </TABLE></center> <hr><h3>Summary of Note Links from this Page</h3> <CENTER> <TABLE Class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <TR> <td bgcolor="#b3ffb3" WIDTH="20%"><A href = "../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_917.htm"><span title="High Quality">Haldane - Naturalism and the Mind</span></A></TD> <td bgcolor="#b3ffb3" WIDTH="20%"><A href = "../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_916.htm"><span title="High Quality">Papineau - Naturalism and the Mind</span></A></TD> <td bgcolor="#e6ecff" WIDTH="20%"><A href = "../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1263.htm"><span title="Plug Note - With Reading List">Supervenience</span></A></TD> <TD WIDTH="20%">&nbsp;</TD> <TD WIDTH="20%">&nbsp;</TD> </TR> </TABLE> </CENTER> <P class = "Centered">To access information, click on one of the links in the table above.</P> <BR><HR><BR><h3>Summary of Note Links to this Page</h3> <CENTER> <TABLE Class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <TR> <td bgcolor="#b3ffb3" WIDTH="20%"><A href = "../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_913.htm#6"><span title="High Quality">Heythrop - Religion and Naturalism Conference</span></A></TD> <TD WIDTH="20%">&nbsp;</TD> <TD WIDTH="20%">&nbsp;</TD> <TD WIDTH="20%">&nbsp;</TD> <TD WIDTH="20%">&nbsp;</TD> </TR> </TABLE> </CENTER> <P class = "Centered">To access information, click on one of the links in the table above.</P> <a name="ColourConventions"></a><br><hr><br><h3 class = "Left">Text Colour Conventions</h3><OL TYPE="1"><li><FONT COLOR = "000000">Black</FONT>: Printable Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018</li><li><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Blue</FONT>: Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018</li><li><FONT COLOR = "800080">Mauve</FONT>: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); &copy; the author(s)</li></OL><BR> <center><BR><HR><BR><TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950><TR><TD WIDTH="30%">&copy; Theo Todman, June 2007 - August 2018.</TD><TD WIDTH="40%">Please address any comments on this page to <A HREF="mailto:theo@theotodman.com">theo@theotodman.com</A>.</TD><TD WIDTH="30%">File output: <time datetime="2018-08-02T18:11" pubdate>02/08/2018 18:11:34</time> <br><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1010.htm">Website Maintenance Dashboard</A></TD></TR><TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="#Top">Return to Top of this Page</A></TD><TD WIDTH="40%"><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1140.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page</A></TD><TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="../../index.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Home Page</A></TD></TR></TABLE></CENTER><HR></BODY></HTML>