Theo Todman's Web Page - Notes Pages

Personal Identity

Numerical Identity

(Text as at 06/07/2023 00:43:12)

Plug Note¹

• Thesis Text:
  1. There is an initial ambiguity that needs clearing up. To quote the Synopsis of "DeGrazia (David) - Human Identity and Bioethics":
     1. When philosophers address personal identity, they usually explore numerical identity: What are the criteria for a person's continuing existence?
     2. When non-philosophers address personal identity, they often have in mind narrative identity²: Which characteristics of a particular person are salient to her self-conception?
  2. DeGrazia explores both conceptions, and acknowledges a debt₃ to Eric Olson for the former and Marya Schechtman for the latter.
  3. Anyway, numerical identity is the relation a thing holds to itself and to nothing else. This definition is agreed to be rather circular, but the intention is clear. The term “numerical” is used because we use the concept of numerical identity in counting things. Things picked out under different concepts are only counted once if they are numerically identical – if they are the very same thing. I may be a man, a person, a father, a grandfather, a student of philosophy but I’m only to be counted once.
  4. As is noted under the above topic of the Logic of Identity⁴, “identity” has been divided into two further senses, namely:-
     1. Strict and Philosophical, and
     2. Loose and Popular
        
     If this division is correct, then it is only the “Strict and Philosophical” version of “identity” that is Numerical Identity properly so-called.
  5. However, it is unclear just how strict the “Strict and Philosophical” version should be. If it requires mereological⁵ essentialism⁶, then it has no application for material things other than “simples”.
  6. It has to be noted that lots of puzzles related to persistence – for instance fission – rely on the premise that “identity” is an equivalence relation, which may not be the case in the “Loose and Popular” sense of the term – if this usage could be clarified.
  7. I will continue to assume that the persistence of organism – despite the continual change of parts – is correctly described as identity in the “Strict and Philosophical” sense.

• ---

  Further Remarks:
  1. This Note on Numerical Identity (NI) is really a sub-topic of that on the Logic of Identity⁷.

References

• Relevant Works cited above:
  1. "DeGrazia (David) - Human Identity and Bioethics", 2005, Book, Read = 7%
• For a page of Links⁸ to this Note, Click here. There would be an enormous number of references under “Identity” alone, so I’ve not tried it.
• Works on this topic that I’ve actually read⁹, include₁₀ the following:-
  • General:
    1. "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Reply to Olson", 2001, Write-Up Note¹¹, Annotations, Internal PDF Link
    2. "Butchvarov (Panayot) - Being Qua Being: Introduction", 1979
    3. "Bynum (Caroline) - Resurrection of the Body in Western Christianity: Preface + Introduction - Seed Images, Ancient and Modern", 1995, Write-Up Note¹²
    4. "Cooper (John) - Body, Soul and Life Everlasting: Preface to the Second Printing", 1989
    5. "DeGrazia (David) - Human Identity and Bioethics: Introduction", 2005, Internal PDF Link
    6. "Gasser (Georg) - Personal Identity and Resurrection: Introduction", 2010, Annotations
    7. "Harris (Henry) - Identity: Introduction", 1995
    8. "Kurtz (Roxanne) - Introduction to Persistence: What’s the Problem?", 2006, Write-Up Note¹³, Annotations, Internal PDF Link
    9. "Longuenesse (Beatrice) - Kant on the identity of persons", 2007, Annotations, Internal PDF Link
    10. "Olson (Eric) - Persistence", 1999
    11. "Olson (Eric) - The Human Animal: Alternatives", 1999
    12. "Olson (Eric) - Thinking Animals and the Constitution View", 2001, Write-Up Note¹⁴, Annotations, Internal PDF Link
    13. "Olson (Eric) - Why We Need Not Accept the Psychological Approach", 1999
    14. "Parfit (Derek) - What We Believe Ourselves To Be", 1986, Write-Up Note¹⁵
    15. "Shoemaker (David) - Personal Identity and Ethics - Introduction", 2009
    16. "Shoemaker (David) - Personal Identity, Rational Anticipation, and Self-Concern", 2009
    17. "Thomas (Janice L.) - The bodily criterion", 2000
    18. "Thomas (Janice L.) - The identity theory", 2000
• A further reading list might start with:-
  • General:
    1. "Anderson (Susan Leigh) - Coconsciousness and Numerical Identity", 1976
    2. "Baxter (Donald L.M.) - Loose Identity and Becoming Something Else", 2001, Internal PDF Link, Read = 11%
    3. "Berglund (Stefan) - Identity and Reduction", 1995
    4. "Candlish (Stewart) - The Inexplicability of Identity", 1971, Internal PDF Link
    5. "Cerullo (Michael A.) - Uploading and Branching Identity", 2015, Annotations, External Link, Internal PDF Link, Read = 133%
    6. "DeGrazia (David) - Human Identity and Bioethics", 2005, Book, Read = 7%
    7. "DeGrazia (David) - Human Persons: Numerical Identity and Essence", 2005, Internal PDF Link, Read = 6%
    8. "Garrett (Brian) - Personal Identity and Extrinsicness", 1990, Internal PDF Link
    9. "Gorham (Geoffrey) - Descartes on Persistence and Temporal Parts", 2002, Read = 7%
    10. "Johansson (Ingvar) - Identity Puzzles and Supervenient Identities", 2006, Internal PDF Link
    11. "Margolis (Joseph) - Persons: Notes on Their Nature, Identity and Rationality", 1980
    12. "Niederbacher (Bruno) - The Same Body Again? Thomas Aquinas on the Numerical Identity of the Resurrected Body", 2010, Internal PDF Link, Read = 27%
    13. "Parfit (Derek) - Persons, Bodies, and Human Beings", 2007, Internal PDF Link, Read = 7%
    14. "Parfit (Derek) - The Unimportance of Identity", 1995, Internal PDF Link, Read = 3%
    15. "Salmon (Nathan) - Identity Facts", 2002, Internal PDF Link
    16. "Schechtman (Marya) - The Malleability of Identity", 2014, Internal PDF Link, Read = 7%
    17. "Shoemaker (Sydney) - Identity & Identities", 2006, Internal PDF Link
    18. "Tognazzini (Neal A.) - Persistence and Responsibility", 2002, Read = 5%
    19. "Williams (Christopher) - Arithmetic Equations", 1989
    20. "Wright (Crispin) - Number as a Sortal Concept", 1983

  ---

• For a list of Works that have been considered, but have missed the cut for inclusion in this Section of my Thesis, see the following:-
  1. Read: No items to list.
  2. Further Reading: No items to list.
• This is mostly a place-holder¹⁶.

---

In-Page Footnotes:

Footnote 3:

1. Not that Eric Olson is the inventor or even the primary exponent of the concept of numerical identity,
2. Nor that Marya Schechtman is not a philosopher!

Footnote 10:

• Some of these only touch on the topic of NI rather tangentially.

---

Table of the Previous 7 Versions of this Note:

Date	Length	Title
20/09/2022 11:24:00	4851	Numerical Identity
01/05/2022 18:20:10	4470	Numerical Identity
15/02/2021 13:40:48	4305	Numerical Identity
30/11/2019 22:58:05	3799	Numerical Identity
14/07/2019 18:05:46	1632	Numerical Identity
11/03/2018 20:19:41	2938	Numerical Identity
27/06/2011 18:57:36	629	Numerical Identity

---

Note last updated	Reading List for this Topic	Parent Topic
06/07/2023 00:43:12	Numerical Identity	Logic of Identity

---

Summary of Notes Referenced by This Note

Awaiting Attention (Personal Identity)	Baker - Persons and Bodies - Response to Olson	Bynum - Resurrection of the Body (Preface + Introduction)	Essentialism	Kurtz - Persistence (Introduction)
Logic of Identity	Mereology	Narrative Identity	Note Links Explanation	Olson - Persons and Bodies - Response
Parfit - What We Believe Ourselves To Be	Plug Note Apologia	Works Read - Explanation

To access information, click on one of the links in the table above.

---

Summary of Notes Citing This Note

Abbreviations	Brain Criterion	Bynum - Resurrection of the Body (Preface + Introduction), 2	Garrett - Animalism, 2, 3, 4	Jen_071112 (Thesis Chapter Breakdown)
Kurtz - Persistence (Introduction)	Narrative Identity, 2, 3	Occasional Identity	Olson - Persons and Bodies - Response	Olson - The Human Animal: Reply to Markosian
Organisms	Parfit - What We Believe Ourselves To Be, 2, 3	Perdurantism	PID Note, Book & Paper Usage, 2, 3	Thesis - Chapter 02 (What are We?), 2, 3
Thesis - Chapter 04 (Basic Metaphysical Issues), 2, 3, 4, 5, 6	Thesis - Chapter 06 (Animalism and Arguments for It)	Thesis - Current Stance, 2, 3	Website Generator Documentation - Functors, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6

To access information, click on one of the links in the table above.

---

Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note

Author	Title	Medium	Extra Links	Read?
Baker (Lynne Rudder)	Making Sense of Ourselves: Self-Narratives and Personal Identity	Paper
Baxter (Donald L.M.)	Loose Identity and Becoming Something Else	Paper
Berglund (Stefan)	Identity and Reduction	Paper
Blatti (Stephan)	A New Argument for Animalism	Paper
Brueckner (Anthony)	Humean Fictions	Paper
Butchvarov (Panayot)	Being Qua Being: Introduction	Paper		Yes
Bynum (Caroline)	Resurrection of the Body in Western Christianity: Preface + Introduction - Seed Images, Ancient and Modern	Paper	2	Yes
Candlish (Stewart)	The Inexplicability of Identity	Paper
Cerullo (Michael A.)	Uploading and Branching Identity	Paper
Cooper (John)	Body, Soul and Life Everlasting: Preface to the Second Printing	Paper		Yes
Corcoran (Kevin)	Rethinking Human Nature: A Christian Materialist Alternative to the Soul	Book	2
DeGrazia (David)	Advance Directives, Dementia, and the Someone Else Problem	Paper	2
DeGrazia (David)	Human Identity and Bioethics	Book	2, 3
DeGrazia (David)	Human Identity and Bioethics: Introduction	Paper	2, 3, 4, 5, 6	Yes
Garrett (Brian)	Personal Identity and Extrinsicness	Paper
Gasser (Georg)	Personal Identity and Resurrection: Introduction	Paper	2	Yes
Gasser (Georg), Ed.	Personal Identity and Resurrection: How Do We Survive Our Death?	Book
Gorham (Geoffrey)	Descartes on Persistence and Temporal Parts	Paper
Harris (Henry)	Identity - Essays Based on Herbert Spencer Lectures Given in the University of Oxford	Book	2
Harris (Henry)	Identity: Introduction	Paper	2	Yes
Hirsch (Eli)	Ontological Arguments: Interpretive Charity and Quantifier Variance	Paper
Johansson (Ingvar)	Identity Puzzles and Supervenient Identities	Paper
Koslicki (Kathrin)	Questions of Ontology	Paper	2, 3
Kurtz (Roxanne)	Introduction to Persistence: What’s the Problem?	Paper		Yes
Longuenesse (Beatrice)	Kant on the identity of persons	Paper		Yes
Margolis (Joseph)	Persons: Notes on Their Nature, Identity and Rationality	Paper	2
Martin (Raymond) & Barresi (John), Eds.	Personal Identity	Book
Niederbacher (Bruno)	The Same Body Again? Thomas Aquinas on the Numerical Identity of the Resurrected Body	Paper	2
Olson (Eric)	Persistence	Paper	2	Yes
Olson (Eric)	The Human Animal: Alternatives	Paper		Yes
Olson (Eric)	Thinking Animals and the Constitution View	Paper		Yes
Olson (Eric)	Why We Need Not Accept the Psychological Approach	Paper		Yes
Parfit (Derek)	Persons, Bodies, and Human Beings	Paper
Parfit (Derek)	The Unimportance of Identity	Paper	2
Parfit (Derek)	We Are Not Human Beings	Paper	2
Parfit (Derek)	What We Believe Ourselves To Be	Paper	2, 3, 4, 5	Yes
Salmon (Nathan)	Identity Facts	Paper
Schechtman (Marya)	The Malleability of Identity	Paper
Shoemaker (David)	Personal Identity and Ethics - Introduction	Paper		Yes
Shoemaker (David)	Personal Identity, Rational Anticipation, and Self-Concern	Paper		Yes
Shoemaker (David)	The Stony Metaphysical Heart of Animalism	Paper
Shoemaker (Sydney)	Identity & Identities	Paper	2
So (Paul)	Lewis’ Personal Identity	Paper
Thomas (Janice L.)	The bodily criterion	Paper	2, 3	Yes
Thomas (Janice L.)	The identity theory	Paper	2	Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Abbreviations	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Brain Criterion	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Chapter 02 (What Are We?)	Paper	2, 3	Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Chapter 04 (Basic Metaphysical Issues)	Paper	2, 3, 4, 5, 6	Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Chapter 06 (Animalism and Arguments for It)	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Current Position	Paper	2, 3	Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Narrative Identity	Paper	2, 3	Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Occasional Identity	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Organisms	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Perdurantism	Paper		Yes
Tognazzini (Neal A.)	Persistence and Responsibility	Paper
Williams (Christopher)	Arithmetic Equations	Paper
Williams (Christopher)	The Identity of Events	Paper
Wright (Crispin)	Number as a Sortal Concept	Paper

---

References & Reading List

Author	Title	Medium	Source	Read?
Anderson (Susan Leigh)	Coconsciousness and Numerical Identity	Paper - Cited	Philosophical Studies 30:1-10, 1976	No
Baker (Lynne Rudder)	Reply to Olson	Paper - Cited	Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind, 2001, e-Symposium on "Persons & Bodies: A Constitution View"	Yes
Baker (Lynne Rudder), Etc.	E-Symposium on 'Persons & Bodies: A Constitution View'	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	Yes
Baxter (Donald L.M.)	Loose Identity and Becoming Something Else	Paper - By Subtopic	Nous, Dec2001, Vol. 35 Issue 4, p592, 10p	11%
Berglund (Stefan)	Human and Personal Identity	Book - By Subtopic (via Paper By Subtopic)	Berglund (Stefan) - Human and Personal Identity	1%
Berglund (Stefan)	Identity and Reduction	Paper - By Subtopic	Berglund - Human and Personal Identity (PhD Dissertation, Lund University), Chapter 2, 1995, pp. 20-43	No
Campbell (Joseph Keim), O'Rourke (Michael) & Silverstein (Harry S.)	Time and Identity	Book - By Subtopic (via Paper By Subtopic)	Campbell (Joseph Keim), O'Rourke (Michael) & Silverstein (Harry S.) - Time and Identity	10%
Candlish (Stewart)	The Inexplicability of Identity	Paper - By Subtopic	Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 49, Number 1, May1971 , pp. 23-37(15)	No
Cerullo (Michael A.)	Uploading and Branching Identity	Paper - Referencing	Minds & Machines (2015) 25:17–36	78%
DeGrazia (David)	Human Identity and Bioethics	Book - Cited	DeGrazia (David) - Human Identity and Bioethics	7%
DeGrazia (David)	Human Persons: Numerical Identity and Essence	Paper - By Subtopic	DeGrazia - Human Identity and Bioethics, 2005, Chapter 2	6%
Garrett (Brian)	Personal Identity and Extrinsicness	Paper - By Subtopic	Philosophical Studies 59, pp. 177-194, 1990	No
Harris (Henry)	Identity - Essays Based on Herbert Spencer Lectures Given in the University of Oxford	Book - By Subtopic (via Paper By Subtopic)	Harris (Henry) - Identity - Essays Based on Herbert Spencer Lectures Given in the University of Oxford	4%
Hirsch (Eli)	Ontological Arguments: Interpretive Charity and Quantifier Variance	Paper - Referencing	Sider (Ted), Hawthorne (John) & Zimmerman (Dean), Eds. - Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics, 2008	17%
Parfit (Derek)	The Unimportance of Identity	Paper - By Subtopic	Harris - Identity - Essays Based on Herbert Spencer Lectures Given in the University of Oxford	3%
Salmon (Nathan)	Identity Facts	Paper - By Subtopic	Salmon (Nathan) - Metaphysics, Mathematics, and Meaning, 2005	No
Salmon (Nathan)	Metaphysics, Mathematics, and Meaning: Philosophy Papers 1	Book - By Subtopic (via Paper By Subtopic)	Salmon (Nathan) - Metaphysics, Mathematics, and Meaning: Philosophy Papers 1	0%
Shoemaker (Sydney)	Identity & Identities	Paper - By Subtopic	Daedalus, Vol. 135, No. 4, On Identity (Fall, 2006), pp. 40-48	No
Sider (Ted), Hawthorne (John) & Zimmerman (Dean), Eds.	Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics	Book - Referencing (via Paper Referencing)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	10%
Thomas (Janice L.)	Mind and Person in the Philosophy of Religion	Book - By Subtopic (via Paper By Subtopic)	Thomas (Janice L.) - Mind and Person in the Philosophy of Religion	Yes
Thomas (Janice L.)	The identity theory	Paper - By Subtopic	Thomas (Janice L.) - Mind and Person in the Philosophy of Religion	Yes
Tognazzini (Neal A.)	Persistence and Responsibility	Paper - By Subtopic	Campbell, O'Rourke & Silverstein - Time and Identity, 2005-10, II - Identity, Chapter 7	5%
Wright (Crispin)	Frege's Conception of Numbers As Objects	Book - By Subtopic (via Paper By Subtopic)	Wright (Crispin) - Frege's Conception of Numbers As Objects	No
Wright (Crispin)	Number as a Sortal Concept	Paper - By Subtopic	Wright - Frege's Conception of Numbers As Objects, 1983, Chapter 3	No

---

Text Colour Conventions

1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2024
2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)

---

© Theo Todman, June 2007 - Sept 2024.	Please address any comments on this page to theo@theotodman.com.	File output: 01/09/2024 01:03:38 Website Maintenance Dashboard
Return to Top of this Page	Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page	Return to Theo Todman's Home Page

---