Theo Todman's Notes

Write-ups Notes Jump Table

Note-Group Purpose: “Write-Ups” are – as might be expected – my Notes on particular philosophical papers. In general, they are detailed accounts of what the papers have to say, with my comments and questions – often in the form of footnotes. I spent a lot of time on this work – in four cases analysing whole books in detail – as a way of forcing myself to think in detail about what philosophers were actually saying. As such, I found the exercise hugely beneficial, though somewhat time-consuming and exhausting. In many cases these Write-Ups remain as pdfs, rather than as Notes. Often there is a stub-Note to link to the pdf; sometimes not even that, so the Write-Up isn’t in the table below. I hope to rectify the latter problem shortly, but converting all the pdfs to Notes will take a while.

Click here for the explanation of the colouration in the table below.

2045: The Year Man Becomes Immortal Aeon Video - Changeling (Blake Lemoine and Google’s experimental AI chatbot LaMDA) Anscombe - On Sensations of Position Armstrong - Bodily Sensations Atherton - Berkeley's Anti-Abstractionism
Atherton - Locke and the Issue Over Innateness Baillie - What Am I? Baker - In Favour Of the Constitution View Baker - Materialism with a Human Face Baker - Personal Identity Over Time
Baker - Persons and Bodies Baker - Persons and Bodies - Precis Baker - Persons and Bodies - Response to Garrett Baker - Persons and Bodies - Response to Noonan Baker - Persons and Bodies - Response to Olson
Baker - Persons and Bodies (Book Summary) Baker - Persons and Bodies (e-Symposium) Baker - Persons in the Material World Baker - Review - Olson - What Are We? Baker - The Coherence Of the Constitution View of Human Persons
Baker - The Coherence Of the Idea of Material Constitution Baker - The Constitution View of Human Persons Baker - The First-Person Perspective Baker - The Human Animal: Big-Tent Metaphysics Baker - The Human Animal: Response to Olson
Baker - The Importance Of Being a Person Baker - The Very Idea of Constitution Baker - What Am I? Bealer - The A Priori Blackburn - Errors and the Phenomenology of Value
Blackburn - Has Kant Refuted Parfit? Brandom - Making It Explicit: Conclusion Brandom - Toward a Normative Pragmatics (Introduction) Bynum - Resurrection of the Body (Preface + Introduction) Carter – Artifacts of Theseus
Chisholm - Identity Through Possible Worlds: Some Questions Chisholm - Which Physical Thing Am I? Chomsky - A Review of B.F.Skinner's Verbal Behavior Clatterbaugh - The Causation Debate in Modern Philosophy 1637 - 1739 Cohen - The Logic of the Third Man
Cowie - The Role of Universal Grammar in Language-Learning Crain - Brass Tacks in Linguistic Theory Crane - Elements of Mind Crane - Review - The Nature of Consciousness Dancy - Contemporary Epistemology
Daniel Dennett – Conditions of Personhood Davidson - Actions, Reasons, and Causes Davidson - Agency Davidson - Intending DeGrazia - Are We Essentially Persons?
Dennett - True Believers Descartes - Fifth Meditation Descartes - Real Distinction Doepke - What are We? Doepke - What We Are
Dretske - Laws of Nature Edgington - Do Conditionals Have Truth-Conditions Edgington - The Logic Of Uncertainty Everett - Don't Sleep There are Snakes Fine - A Counter-Example to Locke's Thesis
Fine - The Non-Identity of a Material Thing and Its Matter Fine - The Non-Identity of a Material Thing and Its Matter (Essay) Fodor - Doing Without What's Within Fodor - The Modularity of Mind Fodor - The Persistence of the Attitudes
Fodor&Pylyshyn - Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture Frankfurt - Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility Frankfurt - Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person Garrett - Animalism Garrett - Personal Identity and Reductionism
Garrett - Persons and Bodies - Response Gemes - Logical Content and Empirical Significance Gemes - The World In Itself Gibbard - Contingent Identity Goodman - The New Riddle of Induction
Goodman - The Problem of Counterfactual Conditionals Haugeland - Semantic Engines Hempel - Laws and Their Role in Scientific Explanation Hume - Of Justice and Injustice Hume - Operation of the Understanding
Jackson - Epiphenomenal Qualia Jackson - Grue Johnston - Human Beings Kagan - Death Kenny - Reason and Intuition
Kripke - Naming and Necessity Kurtz - Persistence (Introduction) Laurence+Margolis - Poverty of Stimulus Le Fanu - Doubts About Darwin Leslie - Starving the Theological Cuckoo
Locke - Essay, Book 2, Chapter 27 Lowe - Locke on Identity Mackie - Causes and Conditions Mackie - The Subjectivity of Values Markosian - The Human Animal: Three Problems for Olson
McDowell - Aesthetic Value McDowell - Values and Secondary Qualities Meinwald - Third Man Mill - Utilitarianism Moore - Certainty
Moore - Common Sense Moore - External World Moore - Four Forms of Scepticism Moreland & Rae - Body & Soul: Establishing a Framework For Approaching Human Personhood Moreland & Rae - Body & Soul: Human Persons as Substances or Property-Things
Moreland & Rae - Body & Soul: Introduction Noonan - Persons and Bodies - Response Olson - Immanent Causation and Life After Death Olson - Personal Identity - Oxford Bibliographies Online Olson - Persons and Bodies - Response
Olson - Review of 'Persons: Human and Divine' Olson - The Human Animal (Precis) Olson - The Human Animal Abstracta Symposium Olson - The Human Animal: Reply to Baker Olson - The Human Animal: Reply to Markosian
Olson - The Human Animal: Reply to Zimmerman Olson - What Are We? Olson - What Are We? Animals Olson - What Are We? Brains Olson - What Are We? Bundles
Olson - What Are We? Constitution Olson - What Are We? Nihilism Olson - What Are We? Souls Olson - What Are We? Temporal Parts Olson - What Are We? The Question
Olson - What Are We? What Now? Parfit - What We Believe Ourselves To Be Pink - Reason and Agency Plato - Republic on Women & Children Popper - Conjectures and Refutations
Popper - Fallibility as a Criterion of Demarcation Popper - Merits of Improbability Rosenberg - Thinking Clearly About Death: Methodology Rosenberg - Thinking Clearly About Death: Prefaces & Prelude Russell - Do We Survive Death?
Russell - Proper Names Schopenhauer - Freedom of the Will Searle - Intentionality Searle - Minds, Brains, and Programs Skyrms - Goodman Paradox
Snowdon - The Self and Personal Identity Spinoza - Ethics Sterelny & Griffiths - From Sociobiology to Evolutionary Psychology Strawson - Why I Have No Future Stroud - Hume's Theory of Ideas
Swinburne - Personal Identity: The Dualist Theory Van Inwagen - Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism Vlastos - Third Man Wickler - Berkeley on Immaterialism Williams - Ethics
Williams - Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame Williams - Relativism Williams - Skepticism Williams - The Self and the Future Wilson - Descartes's Epistemological Argument for Mind-Body Distinctness
Wittgenstein - Bodily Sensations Wong - Relativism Woolhouse - Leibniz and Substance Woolhouse - Locke’s Theory of Knowledge Woolhouse - Spinoza and Substance
Zimmerman - The Human Animal: Objections        

To access information, click on one of the links in the table above (if any).

See the list below for concatenated versions of all my Notes, broken down by category. The concatenation is now - on account of size - restricted to a list of properties rather than the full text. Where the list item is noted as "out of date by n days", this indicates that at least one of the associated Notes has been updated since the concatenation was undertaken, and that the earliest of these instances was n days ago:-

  1. Animadversions (Out of Date by 16 days)
  2. Birkbeck Supervisions
  3. Blog (Out of Date by 10 days)
  4. Control Pages (Out of Date by 14 days)
  5. Essays
  6. Personal Identity (Out of Date by 16 days)
  7. Status Reports (Out of Date by 17 days)
  8. Website Documentation (Out of Date by 14 days)
  9. Write-ups (Out of Date by 11 days)

Note Qualities: for an explanation of the colouration in the table above, see the table below! "Note Quality" is a new feature, is somewhat experimental, and subject to checking and refinement.

None Specified  
High Quality Note quality relates both to its intrinsic – albeit subjective – quality, and to its completeness and / or length. I’ll try to refine this over time. Also, as I only have 3 levels, it is relative. It is supposed to tell the reader whether it’s worth clicking and reading, and to remind me of work yet to be done! So, “High Quality” Notes are the best I’ve got – usually long and complete and – hopefully – worth reading. 
High Quality - PDF As above, but currently existing only as pdfs, awaiting conversion to Note format. As this is a laborious task, it’s work in progress. Most of these pdfs were produced during my undergraduate days in 2000 – 2003. 
Medium Quality “Medium Quality” Notes are usually those on which I’ve made significant progress but are still incomplete – being either still work in progress, or Notes that I got stuck on or bored with. Occasionally they are complete but short. 
Medium Quality - PDF As above, but currently existing only as pdfs, awaiting conversion to Note format. These were produced during my undergraduate days in 2000 – 2003, and were left incomplete because I ran out of time, or got bored or stuck. 
Low Quality “Low Quality” Notes are usually just place-holders, or Notes I’ve just started. 
Low Quality - PDF As above, but in pdf form. There shouldn't be any! 
Plug Note - With Reading List These may be quite extensive – particularly if they have worked-out reading lists – but usually contain the disclaimer: “A number of my philosophical Notes are “promissory notes” currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. I’ve decided to add some text – whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive – for all these identified topics related to my Thesis. As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists.” 
Plug Note - Reading List TBA As above, but the reading list is yet to be supplied. 

© Theo Todman, June 2007 - July 2024. Please address any comments on this page to File output:
Website Maintenance Dashboard
Return to Top of this Page Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page Return to Theo Todman's Home Page