COMMENSAL ISSUE 104


The Newsletter of the Philosophical Discussion Group
Of British Mensa

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Number 104 : December 2000

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ARTICLES
20th September 2000 : Roger Farnworth

DETERMINISM AND FREE WILL

It was a great pleasure to read Malcolm Burns response (C102/37) to my article claiming that "all human actions are determined by preceding causes" which as both premise and conclusion is a tautology. Indeed, it would be if the statement were an argument rather than an observation. The observation is that any decision (that is not random) is preceded by motives (which may be conscious or unknowable). It is not possible both to make a choice based on motives and simultaneously choose those motives on which the choice was based. It is not only illogical but in practice impossible to choose to have motives to do what you do not want to do. Try it. You will observe that your strongest coalition of wants will motivate you and determine your course of action. There is no tautology here.

So determinism is an observation of experience on which a theory is based. Both Malcolm and I have never made a choice (except under coercion) that is not the outcome of preferences, wishes, wants, prudence, duty or any other motive. This experience of coming to a conclusion is for both of us "an essential part of what it is to be me, a human being". No one else controls my motives or dictates the conclusion I reach. The difference between us is that Malcolm believes that if he chose to walk on the sunny side he could have walked in the shade despite his motives. Of course, he could have walked on the shady side just to prove me wrong but that would be an additional motive. If he thinks that with the same set of unaltered motives and values he could have concluded differently he is deluded.

He also owes us an explanation of how he could defy his own motives. This task is made more difficult by his claim that with hindsight we could not know what our motives were.

I have had a lifetime of thinking through the determinist position on ethics and the more I perceive the reasons for the difficulties that entangle some people the more compassion I feel for them. In the paper "What is Man for" I show that there is no contradiction whatsoever between determinism and ethics. I want justice for people whether they are, to use your terms, good or bad. In my interest in curbing the arms trade it makes no difference to me whether the person who makes a gun or is killed by a gun is good or bad. What I want is to restrict the suffering caused by the arms trade.

I know that it is difficult to live with a determinist view especially in relationships of affection, trust, resentment and responsibility, but it can be done. As Susan Greenfield said in the final part of her recent series on the brain, we invent the illusion of free will because we cannot psychologically accept that we are determined.

Roger Farnworth



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