Dear Theo,
Thanks for C89 , which I opened with trepidation, half expecting to find some former contribution of mine squashed beneath the intellectual swat of one or other of our more persistent contributors. I was let off lightly, and shall refrain in future from making dilettante excursions into the realm of logical analysis.
You ask ( C89 p.19 ) for my comments on moral and ethical systems "primarily aimed at perfecting the individual" or "at improving the individual's relationship to the deity", pointing out that order can arise spontaneously among individuals acting selfishly. As follows:
I consider that order can arise spontaneously only in the absence of what we term a self. I argued in my last contribution ( C89 p.16 ) that the advent of reflexive awareness constitutes the formation of a self, and that prior thereto the organism has no conception of itself as a discrete entity. A matrix of relationships can arise among individuals, but only once individuals have emerged from a matrix of relationships. Even though a single ant is perceived by us to be an individual, it cannot act 'selfishly' because it has no individual self to which to refer its actions. Its actions are referred to the totality of its being as an ant belonging to a particular colony. If the word 'self' is applicable at all, it applies to that colony, although the colony in its turn is referred (as it were) to the particular environment of which it forms an integral part. This does not mean, of course, that the ant is acting altruistically. Moral behaviour only arises among selves, and spontaneous order can only arise among human individuals where the self is temporarily or partially set aside, usually as the result of a process of training and discipline, as in a football team, or with 'jamming' among jazz musicians.
It seems to me that, paradoxically, it is only when the self is set aside in some way that the individual can realise itself in a deeper sense than is given through simple introspection. Individualism at its best, or most effective, gives each person a proper sense of his or her own value as a preliminary to, and in a reciprocal relation with, an active and fruitful engagement with others. At its worst, where it begins and ends with the self in isolation, the result is alienation and disorder, to the general detriment.
The egotism of actors is notorious, but what is a great, or even a competent, performance other than something in which an actor realises himself as something greater than himself in isolation, an act of self-transcendence that entrains the audience as the actor enters into an imaginary web of circumstances and relationships that goes beyond the sphere of his private concerns ?
You mention the coercive nature of dysfunctional societies or ethical systems. It seems to me that all moral systems, and the societies that they underpin, involve some element of coercion, even if it is merely the threat of ostracism if the individual fails to comply with some minimal standards of expected behaviour. It is possible to conceive an extreme form of individualism in which individuals would be ostracised for failing to act individualistically! Individualism is only meaningful within the context of the social system that it seeks to enhance.
As for the individual's relationship to the deity, my contention is that the primary function of any given conception of deity is to provide a nexus for individual selves. 'My god' is always primarily 'our god', and religion is only vigorous where there is a conception of deity held in common by a majority of believers. The subjective mystical flights of the individual are interpreted in terms of that common conception, and where religion is lively they reinforce and enhance it: think for instance of Bernini's sculpture of 'The Ecstasy of St. Teresa'. It is as e.g. part of the 'Body of Christ's Believers' that the individual worshipper finds redemption. Of course, it is not necessarily the conscious purpose of religion to promote social order (although it can be where priesthoods become unduly corrupt or cynical and specific interests are at stake): rather it is the unconscious admission of the need for it if we as individuals are not to be abandoned to the ultimate futility of isolation.
You mention in your comments on Norman Mackie's contribution ( C89 p.12 ) some erudite discussion "as to whether Hitler, Himmler and the SS acted ethically according to their own (to us) perverted ethic". If it is the case that, as I put it in my C89 contribution, "we call that moral which tends towards coherence among persons", but that the conception of the person differs from one ethical system to another, then I would say yes: the Nazis were acting ethically within their own terms of reference. An ethical system can be simultaneously moral within its own terms of reference and immoral within the terms of a system that has a broader conception of the person i.e., with reference to fascist ideology in Germany, one that is prepared to admit the 'personhood' of Jews, Slavs etc. rather than to categorise them as subhuman. This position goes beyond moral relativism without appealing to supernatural sanction or religious absolutism: the fundamental tenet of morality is that all persons are akin to ourselves and must be treated accordingly (if, as above, we are not to be abandoned to the futility of isolation and the destruction that it entails), and it finds its final or absolute term in the broadest possible conception of the person.
Fascism was only dysfunctional to the extent that it finally upset more people than it satisfied. 'The Nazis: A Warning from History' showed us a number of Germans ready to confess to how wonderful it all seemed, how enraged they were by the attempt to assassinate that nice Mr Hitler etc. and I have no doubt that if Moseley had somehow contrived to get into power the British would have a similar tale to tell.
It seems to be a regrettable, but perhaps necessary, tendency of moral behaviour that it constantly posits a category of persons, or non-persons, in contradistinction to which the moral individual defines him- or herself: e.g. decent taxpaying citizens versus shiftless crusties; free-spirited, unmaterialistic New Age nomads versus complacent middle-class reactionaries and so forth. When someone, such as the late Princess of Wales, does something that tends to set aside such divisions in a broader conception of humanity, we are duly impressed by her compassion and magnanimity: in contradistinction, of course, to the (entrepreneurial?) values expressed by those dreadful paparazzi, or whoever else we hold responsible for her death.
Michael Nisbet
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Just one thing, though - while individuality is important to individuals, we can model societies, at least as far as their economic activity is concerned, as though individuality didn’t exist. Maybe this is OK as long as the members of society follow their scripts, as Vijai suggested ?
Theo