3rd September 1998 : Frank Walker
I BELIEVE
In the high and far off times before the Long Vacation of Commensal, I was reproached by another contributor for saying "I believe", in my own contribution, on the ground that my personal belief was neither here nor there, and indeed totally irrelevant to any discussion of philosophical principles. This is my too-belated apology and explanation.
Of course, any one person’s personal belief is irrelevant in a philosophical discussion of general principles (but may be relevant in a particular example, eg. exploring the state of mind of a flat-earther shanghaied on a round the world yacht race). A widely held belief may be relevant, a universally held belief almost certainly so. There are certain consequences if all human beings believe that tonight will be fairly dark and will certainly be followed by tomorrow when it will be light again.
However, I was using short hand. What I meant was that I have considered and weighed all the evidence known to me : I have considered all the arguments put forward for and against : I have rejected the untrue evidence and the fallacious arguments : I have come to a conclusion. This is an awful lot of meaning to attach to two words, but it is a useful phrase in that meaning, and saves an awful lot of tedious repetition. I would assume every member of PDG had gone through the same process before advancing an opinion.
I believe there is a fountain within the perimeter of Great Court, Trinity College, Cambridge. I may one day produce an article arguing the case pro- and con. I may pray in aid the principle of universal belief above. If I do, I shall conclude the fountain is in truth there, or at any rate it is rational so to believe and that those who believe otherwise or have no belief are ill-informed or irrational.
Frank Walker
Frank : Agreed, but I would add that the term "belief" is ambiguous. Even so, beliefs are relevant whether they are your well-founded deductions or the "off the wall" speculations of others. I would add that our most fundamental beliefs, though we may give reasons for holding them, are not open to proof without incurring infinite regress. For instance, we cannot argue that we should accept logic, as this would involve the use of logic. All we can do is show it in action. Where the fun starts is in deciding which beliefs are of this foundational kind and which are deductions from other more primitive beliefs.
Theo