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1. The world is open to investigation.
1.1 That is, it is possible to come to a knowledge of what the world is like, what it contains, what its history has been and what its future is likely to be.
Albert Dean : Suggest: "; what it is’, in place of ", what it contains’ .In detail, only because it is the opening statement so any ambiguity in it may cast into everything that follows. Strictly " … what the world is like, what it contains," gives; " … what the cat is like, what it contains," with no implication one can know what the mouse is like.
EG: As writ one can know the container and its details, and the container’s contents, but know little of the details of the contents. Which I am fairly sure is not what you mean.Theo : Substituting "what it is" for "what it contains" would lead to "what it is like, what it is, …". This reads inelegantly. I'm not thinking of the universe as a box, but as (say) a mathematical set S with contents, so that for all x one can say whether or not x belongs to S. What I say is that, for the world W, all x belong to W. Note that, according to my definition, the world is not identical with the physical universe.
1.2 I use the term "world" to refer to all that exists, has existed or will exist, starting from the material universe and extending to spiritual entities, including God, should such exist.
Albert Dean : Only one query. In the above your "world" seems equal to my "universe" .And it appears to me that to arrive at my "greater universe" you would need your "world" + my "great void" .The great void being the infinite emptiness I think must exist, as an emptiness that is real because otherwise there would be nowhere in which my "universe", your "world", could exist. So, I am not clear if you see your "world" as a thing inclusive of activity set in void or, because some say space is itself a form of energy, if you see the void as a substance included in "world" .An incidental point: Is a correct balance guaranteed in the energy account with " … all that exists, has existed or will exist"? Personally, I have so far found it impossible to rattle off that favourite word set of ours in any way that does not in some way or other imply energy can be created and destroyed. If you managed a solution there then be assured if I ever notice it I will nick the phrasing!
Theo : Taking your subsequent remarks into account, I might change "I" to something else (ie. to avoid confusion with "1". Taking your substantive point, I take it that the (physical) universe is co-extensive with space - there is no such thing as the "great void" outside it, as space and time are meaningless in the absence of matter. However, my "world" is not necessarily co-extensive with space-time, and would include anything outside the physical universe. With respect to conservation laws, I'm not at the moment excluding a creation ex nihilo. Conservation laws are true in the physical universe we now inhabit, as far as we can tell - I've no argument against this, but I'm not discussing the matter at the moment.
1.2.1 By including God in the world, I am not to be understood as presupposing a Spinozist pantheism. The relation of God, should he exist, to the material universe is a separate issue.
Albert Dean : I think you still need the quotes on "world" here, because you use quotes with it again in 1.2.2, but caution, they work like brackets in maths, so suggest use either only "world" or only "the world" - as in 1.2.2. (Consistency will also make it easier for any foreign visitors to your site who may not be all that fluent in the language - another reason to be particularly clear in what is said).
Theo : I could include all my technical terms in quotations, but this would be tedious. It's only when I self-consciously refer to one of my overloaded expressions that I need do this.
1.2.2 Note also that in this treatise, "the world" does not have any connotations of "the (evil) world system" as in Christian Theology.
Albert Dean : Rhetorical question: Is that because you don’t want to put such a system in, or is it because you want to leave it out. Half the US Bible Belt will drop out at this point, and the other half will let their kids carry on reading. Is your site infant safe, what philosopher would create an open site that is not.
Theo : I say this to my fundamentalist friends, lest they become confused.
1.2.3 By including theological elements in the argument at this early stage, I am not thereby stating that theology is the most important issue with which we must deal nor, in any qualifying remarks, am I trying to downgrade its importance. Either approach at this stage would be to pre-empt the discussion. What I am attempting to do is define the field of discourse.
Albert Dean : Given you have set up your own definition of the "world" are you sure "theological" is an appropriate word to use. Would "religious" be better. Many people who enter your site may be of a non-Christian faith. The word "theological" to most visitors would imply a set of formally linked formal declarations of a religious nature; and a particular set for many with established views. Have you actually so far said anything that such visitors would consider "theological" as against "cosmological".
Theo : In my view, "religious" has to do with personal devotion, whereas "theology" doesn't demand any personal commitment. As I'm dealing with cognitive matters rather than matters of commitment, I think "theological" is the better term.
1.2.4 "The world is all that is the case" (Wittgenstein).
1.2.4.1 It must be noted that (like Wittgenstein) I refer the term "world" to facts rather than simply to things. Hence, "the world" refers not only to existent entities but also to relations between existent entities.
Albert Dean : Actually, you are doing a bit more than that, Theo. In the above you went to great lengths to include in "world" that which possibly was, might be, and could possibly be.
Theo : You are right. But so does Wittgenstein - he refers to possible states of affairs in logical space. I ought to make this more explicit - thanks for pointing this out. I have to admit that, until I've earned my academic spurs, I ought to avoid quoting philosophers whose works I may have read but not studied. A chap from Louisiana University has picked me up on my (ab)use of Kant !
1.3 Idealism and solipsism are to be rejected.
1.3.1 By idealism (immaterialism) I understand the view (held by Berkeley and others) that, since all experience is mediated through the senses and is perceived by the mind, so that all we perceive are mental images, matter is an unnecessary hypothesis which may be dispensed with.
Albert Dean : What follows in this section hinges on clear understanding of the above. I think you need to work on the whole passage, there is a heck of a lot to absorb between the underlines, try: By idealism (immaterialism) I understand the view (held by Berkeley (Anglican Bishop?) and others) that matter is an unnecessary hypothesis which may be dispensed with, to mean that because all experience is mediated through the senses and perceived by the mind, all we perceive are mental images. And I think you should also make clear if Berkeley, etc., and you mean energy or energy in the form of matter - there’s a lot of confusion in the world as to whether thought is or is not electrical. It might even be best to in fact add that clarification as a distinct note to ensure visitors did not miss it. Note. re whole site: (i) Suggest indicate usually granted political/religious leaning and active period of all authorities quoted, gives visitors an idea if bias should be allowed for. (ii) Trouble with this sort of thing is having gone over everything a dozen times one is reading one’s memory more than what is there. Trick I read in net mag is switch whole thing to an arty font and where you stumble do some serious editing.
Theo : Thanks. I ought to be more explicit on the sources, but I maybe ought to delete all the name-dropping until I've studied the various worthies more thoroughly. The problem here is that books have been written on this proposition. All I'm really doing is announcing my view, not really arguing for it.
1.3.2 Solipsism is an extreme form of immaterialism (which states) that only I exist, since all I perceive are my own thoughts or perceptions.
Albert Dean : Suggest insert "that goes beyond declaring the material world is an hypothesis that can be dispensed with and says".
Theo : Good point. Might include that one ! I was conscious that I might be giving a heterodox version of solipsism as well - though I thought my (invented) description of it as an extension of idealism was rather clever !
1.3.3 I reject these views, not because they are refutable, but because they are irrefutable. They explain everything & nothing.
Albert Dean : Suggest use "and" here, and everywhere, foreign character sets might display another symbol.
Theo : Fine. Good point.
1.4 By saying that the world is open to investigation, I am not suggesting that the world is so perspicuous as to be transparent. Patient research is required before the world yields up its secrets.
Albert Dean : If you read 1.3.1 you have "Berkeley" actually say looking at the material world is a waste of time. But in 1.3.2 you do not have "Solipsism" actually say one’s "visions" do not deserve attention. So, 1.4 is in effect only addressing the "Berkeley" half of the "Berkeley - Solipsism" couplet you implicitly form in 1.3.3. If you develop 1.3.2 to have "Solipsism" say one’s "visions" do not deserve attention that will also make it much clearer as to why in 1.3.3 you say they explain nothing. But I think you will still have to do more work on either both 1.3.1 and 1.3.2, or on 1.3.3, to show (negating reasons) how 1.3.2 and 1.3.3 can be rejected because they are irrefutable - else when you get to 1.4 you will have given no implied or stated supporting reason (which latter could go in 1.3.3) why the world should be investigated. And without reason to investigate your 1.3.3 is also rejectable because it is irrefutable, and 1.4 ends up hanging in the air a bit.
Theo : I agree that I ought to open a footnote on Popper in 1.3.3.
1.4.1 As will be seen, the knowledge I have in mind is neither complete nor indubitable. Later, I state that no knowledge of the world is certain. It is also the case that many areas of potential knowledge are beyond investigation in practice because of the time, distances or energies required to collect the information.
Albert Dean : Above fine.
Theo : A first ! Sooner or later I'll unequivocally accept one of your criticisms (I'm highly resistant to criticism, in case you haven't noticed !).
1.4.1.1 However, since there is no a priori reason why the world should be such as to present a consistent picture or to be subject to fruitful investigation, these facts are worth noting.
Albert Dean : Regarding 1.4.1.1 above. (i) Who told you, or what have you observed that demonstrates, there is no reason why the world, etc. You are very naughty at times, chucking these bits of unsubstantiated dogma in all over the place. Also, is "a priori" essential or helpful. (ii) Suggest delete "these facts are worth noting" because the "these" does not point at anything specific so leads one to expect a list of facts to follow that does not. Alternatively perhaps consider "those facts" or "such facts". But note confusion will still exist, is the "no reason .… " one of the facts. And, if it is not then why does the "no reason … " make it worth noting what is said in 1.4.1.
IE: 1.4.1 does not say what the visitor it to do with the information in it that they should make a note of it.Theo : I'm acknowledging in advance the theological (or, dare I say it, Kantian, point (countered by the cosmological anthropic principle) that the fact that we can understand the world at all deserves some explanation, and reminding the impatient reader that I will need to address the matter later. A pointer to the relevant section would doubtless help.
1.5 In saying that the world is open to investigation, I am not necessarily favouring scientific realism as against constructive empiricism, though I do incline towards the latter.
Albert Dean : Suggest delete ", though I do incline towards the latter" because it is not until 1.5.3 you explain why you favour the latter.
Theo : Maybe.
1.5.1 By scientific realism I understand the proposition that the theories of science give true accounts of what the world contains, ie. that the entities (eg. electrons) postulated in scientific theories actually exist and are not simply mental constructs invented to explain the phenomena.
1.5.2 By constructive empiricism I understand the view that science only aims to give us theories that are empirically adequate; that it deals with phenomena only, and not with any putative underlying unobservables.
Albert Dean : Either add an example in 1.5.2 as you have one in 1.5.1, or take out the example in 1.5.1.
Theo : Fair point. I'll add an example (when I can think of one).
1.5.3 It will be noted later that I am mainly interested in models that explain the relationships between phenomena. Hence, I incline towards constructive empiricism. However, it may be that these models describe entities that are real, though unobservable. In any case, bounds are set on the sorts of entities that may explain the phenomena.
Albert Dean : Suggest a further joint example here, to illustrate what sort of phenomena you mean in 1.5.3. Perhaps as a note, like (discovery as against invention = knowledge as against guesswork); water springs out of my lawn because of (i) the local geology, discovered by spadework (ii) a supposed hidden pump, being as good a suggestion as any. The reason is of no importance to the plant and animals in the garden.
Theo : Good point.
1.6 I do not accept Kant’s view that the world appears as it does because we are as we are.
Ie. that space & time are constructs we place on the world in order to perceive it.Albert Dean : Try to change first word above as in Arial it looks above and below that you have two clause 1.6.1, some viewers may not have eyesight that is all that good. Check also possible "IE:" misprint. (The Palaeofascist (?) Kant’s ninth century Scandinavian view - sheer fiction, but you see what I meant above about helping the reader by indicating bias or lack of it).
Theo : OK re typography. As noted above, I've been accused of misinterpreting Kant here. I don't know what you mean by the sentence in brackets.
1.6.1 It is true that our intuitions are circumscribed by the small corners of space-time to which we are habituated. However, it is possible for our intuitions to be educated by what is there.
Albert Dean : In 1.6 you have "space and time", in 1.6.1 you have "space-time", suggest check whole site and ensure style is compatible with context where found. Also, and I think also unintentionally, you seem to have implied we are in space-time. I would be more inclined to spell it out and say we are actually in a motion-memory universe that from childhood we become habituated to perceive we are in space-time. (Interestingly, until we achieve absolute zero, we do not know anything can stand still. If standing still was the condition the universe could not change anywhere, if otherwise it must always change everywhere. What does it imply in regard to time if ‘for all eternity everywhere’ standing still is not permitted).
Theo : The reason for the space / time difference is that Kant didn't know about Space-time and thought space and time were subject to separate intuitions. This is one of my complaints against Kant. However, Kant is a very deep thinker and my treatment is superficial. When referring to space-time, I'm speaking relativistic physics. Childhood intuitions are sub-Kantian. I seem to remember a discussion in Commensal on time ("does the past exist") where Roger Farnworth alleged that saying the past exists implies that all kettles that have ever boiled are forever boiling, and isn't this a waste of energy. I had an answer for this, but not a good one. The reason I mention space-time is that our knowledge of the cosmos is of the (often very) distant past - it is the best quality archaeology one could ask for. Taking your bracketed point - standing still is only possible in the asymptotic hyperbolic universe ("heat death"). Any talk on these matters without a thorough understanding or special & general relativity is nonsense, so I'm keeping out of the details.
1.7 Even though the openness of the world to investigation is an initial premise, it is also an observation of the way the world appears to be.
Albert Dean : Suggest "observation on" in place of "observation of". I think you have this backwards. Surely it was prior general observation that the world was open to investigation that led to its particular investigation. And the results simply reinforced the belief, by indicating that more detail could be discovered. A question then arises as to when and where did general observation crystallise sufficiently to motivate such investigation: For Homo-Whatever; probably in hunting and gathering in Africa, when and where extremely precise discovery and invention skills were vital to anyone wishing to live more than a day. And before that, with the eyes, nose, teeth and claws of our shrew-like ancestors. And before that, with the beak and fins of whatever it was that was our origin and had to swim about to survive. Clearly trial and error has been going on for several billion years. The thing that made the Renaissance a typhoon for Europe and a whirlpool for the rest of the world was not a sudden growth in scientific inquiry. It was only that for the first time scientific instruments became significant and European domination of the rest of the world suppressed practically every Afro - Asian theory and theoretician. And since then everything that could be done was as dominated by what the instruments could do as beforehand it had been dominated by what they could not do. And practically all instruments are dominated by what technicians and engineers have been able to do in making them. Which means money. Which brings us to an interesting parallel. Modern science simply tipped a financial pyramid created by denial of fair income to those on negligible wage here and elsewhere. Thus, I could take what you write in 1.7.1 below and say: "Mankind’s collective poverty in the world has increased rapidly, especially since the Renaissance. This increase in poverty, as a result of scientific enquiry, is an important factor in the belief that the world is, in fact, open to exploitation." Poverty and exploitation were of course in the world before the Renaissance. Where did they come from, Africa, and there from the oceans of a couple of billion years ago; where began the nature of the beast. And, as I have already indicated, it is only that with the Renaissance the economic instruments of Europe became more powerful so as Europe might squash the economies and economists of elsewhere. The only thing is of course, that had it not been Europe it would no doubt have been some other continent that decided things in the last few hundred years!
Theo : I must think about of/on. I'm not just making an animadversion, but then I'm not making a (single, sensory) observation either. I expect I agree with some of your other thoughts. In my logical scheme the intelligibility of the world is a premise, but it is motivated by past success (on the part of others) in making the world intelligible. Without the world actually being open to investigation, that investigation wouldn't lead to any useful results; as, I allege, it has. You are right to point out that all creatures have evolved in a world in which their accurate observations of it are rewarded by practical, and later evolutionary, success. However, evolutionary theory is itself a deduction from the evidence of a universe open to investigation - but not a straightforward one, and not one to chuck in at the start of the paper. I don't agree with your East/West divide view, nor on the tyranny of instruments. In any case, I'm dealing with epistemology & metaphysics not in social theory. I'm only (in this context) interested in the cognitive impact of scientific investigation, not on its adverse social impact (I would say that, all things considered, its impact is highly positive; without modern farming and medical technique, 90% of us would not survive). Incidentally, most of the fundamentals of science were discovered using Heath-Robinsonesque instrumentation rather than the multi-billion-dollar colliders of today. Please let me know a true Afro-Asian theory that has been suppressed.
1.7.1 Mankind’s collective knowledge of the world has increased rapidly, especially since the Renaissance. This increase in knowledge, as a result of scientific enquiry, is an important factor in the belief that the world is, in fact, open to investigation.
Albert Dean : Consider " … in supporting the belief … "
Theo : Correct. Good.
1.8 By insisting on this openness, I mean to deny any unavoidable pervasive error in the way we perceive the world to be. I deny systematic deception, whether as a result of any distorting influence of our own senses or resulting from any ultramundane entity.
Albert Dean : King Canute: Double "negative" - you can not avoid the unavoidable. The problem you have here and in 1.8.1 below is that if God causes the deception it is an unavoidable deception - see illustrative comment between 1.8.1 and 1.8.1.1.
Theo : You'll have to try again on this one, though maybe I should rephrase things to make it easier to understand. I don't deny that we may fall into a pervasive error in our interpretation of the universe. What I assert is that this error is avoidable, and does not arise because of some malicious or benign demon distorting how we see or understand things.
1.8.1 Hence, the openness of the world implies that any explanation of the appearance of things that relies on divine or other deception is false.
Albert Dean : Suggest " … on a divine … ". For above and below - I would say that if God has made some piece of rock seem a casting of a billion year old bone then surely for us that piece of rock is a casting of a billion year old bone. But then of course we would not be aware the scientific explanation was based upon a deception. Meaning that possibly it should actually be " … on a declared divine … ". Remember that here I am, in the best tradition of examiners, trying to correct for the "avoid the unavoidable" problem that begins in 1.8, and come up with a solution for that as said and for "avoid the avoidable", so I can carry on marking as if what was writ was right. (Other solutions may be possible depending upon what is done in 1.8 - which, for the average foreign visitor with a vocabulary of about 250 English words will be a major stumbling block if they reach it).
Theo : Some of what you say above is unclear to me. I've tried inserting some extra quotations, but it doesn't always work. I don't agree that I've got an extra "not" in there (double negatives are linguistic inellegancies, not logical errors), so don't accept your attempted corrections. I've heard it argued that God has told us that the Universe is only 6,000 years old - so he's not deceived us. I'm unsympathetic with this view, of course, because one of the reasons we accept the Bible as "God's Word" (if we do) is because of its congruence with what else we know of the world - or at least so I maintain at length elsewhere in this paper. Maybe Foreign visitors with 250 words of English can check out another site.
1.8.1.1 Hence, for example, the assertion that God or any impersonal process created the universe with the appearance of age is false. If the universe appears to be very old, it is because it is very old.
Albert Dean : Suggest check in entire site that "world" and "universe" are not inadvertently substituted where not intended. Now here can you see you are doing to your visitor in without-God language exactly the same as the Bible Belt does in with-God language to its visitor. You are tricking them. The words "age" and "old" condition the visitor into their habitual time perception mode. There are three usual options; no time, a single moment, time. We do not know which is the case. You have leapt to the third. If the third is not the case, then if the universe (world) appears to be very old, it is NOT NECESSARILY because it is very old. It becomes - it looks old because it looks old, which is near to the Bible Belt version of "we are here because we are here" .IE: All the energy in the universe may be in static, spinning and flight suspense so that age does not weary it. All we know for sure is that in living memory we have seen forms turn into other forms, and, whilst observation of the world does not yet indicate a stage setting was necessary, observation of the word may arrive at the impression it was, in that terrible lizards are not mentioned in the Bible. But then, if the Bible were written today would it mention Coca-Cola, and, if it did, would it also mention that the species evolved from a terrible drink that including cocaine. And the bottles skipped into the ark two by two.
Theo : "World" and "Universe" are distinct terms and I hope I've not muddled them up. I'm not ruling out the possibility that the Universe might have been created by some entity outside it (but still in "the world", though not in your "great void" which implies space). Why should I give equal time to the fantastical notion that time does not exist ? The Bible may well not have mentioned coca cola, but if I were trying to describe the filling of the ark, I'd have mentioned the fact that some of the passengers found their quarters a bit cramped - and so would anyone else.
1.8.1.2 Taking this example further, let us assume for the sake of argument that the universe was created ex nihilo instantaneously some time ago. Then, at the time of its creation, it would not, according to my principle, have borne the appearance of age; for that would have been deceptive. Consequently, the universe could not have created in a developed state, nor could it quickly have attained to such a state.
Albert Dean : Suggest "not have been created".
Theo : Oops ! Thanks. I'll fix that in the next release.
1.8.1.3 Hence, according to the principle of openness, any assumption of the type of omfalos (the notion that [on the assumption that the Biblical record in Genesis Chapter 1 is history] Adam would have been created with a navel, trees with rings etc., and therefore would have had the appearance of having had a natural origin even though directly created) is fallacious.
Albert Dean : I think somewhere in all so far you need to clarify it more that this "principle of openness" is to be seen as like any other principle in any other field. I don’t know if to a Judao - Christian scholar it may be an entirely familiar name for a standard proposition. But, even if so, visitors of other faiths might not be familiar with it at all. And, in any event, to tighten things up a bit it would be good if somewhere earlier you say something like "the p of o that information can be discovered about the world that can be used to discover further information about the world is a principle that stands until it falls in the same way that the mechanical principle that a domino can be set up to knock over a further domino also stands until it falls.
Theo : I've used the term "openness" repeatedly in what precedes. I'm not writing for morons.
1.8.2 Similarly, appeals to unrecorded miracles to explain geological or other phenomena are to be rejected.
Albert Dean : Do you mean appeals to freshly concocted miracles not claimed to be written in the book or evidenced in any other way in the world, or appeals not claimed to be written in the book but claimed to be evidenced in some other way in the world, or both.
Theo : Interesting. I suppose I meant "both". I'm not sure what the evidence for an unrecorded miracle would look like. What I'm trying to say is that I've no time for "explanations" of ancient phenomena that come out of the air and claim a miracle. I would be sceptical both of recent claimed miracles and ancient recorded miracles, but appeals to ancient unrecorded miracles are hardly explanations.
1.8.2.1 Appeals to recorded miracles, such as the one alluded to in the above example, are to be evaluated as described elsewhere in this paper.
Albert Dean : Haven’t got to elsewhere yet. But if it doesn’t say in elsewhere the same query applies to 1.8.2.1 as for 1.8.2.
Theo : I cover miracles in the central chapters (especially Chapters 13). I could do with a "search" function, though I don't know how to do this. Do you ?
1.9 Because the world is open to investigation, divine "special revelation" is not essential for mankind to an understanding of its general laws.
Albert Dean : Suggest "to have an" in place of "to an". Also, would it not be better to just use "general revelation" and "general laws". And, have you noticed the clause may imply revelation might be necessary for us to understand the laws of revelation, in order we may know which laws need to be revealed and in what way; which you need to know to be able to do 1.9.1 below, which in its present form seems an example of revelation starvation!
Theo : Thanks for pointing out the typos. I originally wrote the document on one of the first Apple Macs. I had to scan the printout back in (a most tedious task) and evidently things occasionally got lost in the translation. In Christian parlance, "Special Revelation" is a technical term for Scripture (God's Word), as distinct from General Revelation in the creation (God's Works).
1.9.1 Clearly, however, special revelation would be necessary to establish the truth of those propositions of Christianity (eg. the nature of the person & work of Jesus Christ) that do not fall into the category of general laws.
Albert Dean : Suggest "such as" in place of "eg." and commas instead of brackets, easier to read. Also, change "&" to "and" (and same in 1.9.1.1 below). 1.9.1 is not at all clear to me. Do you mean that the nature and activities of Jesus were laws that may or may not be correctly described by church propositions, that the often claimed continuing presence and intervention of Christ are also laws that may or may not be correctly described by church propositions. Or are you saying the propositions are the laws, of the church in that the church requires its priests, etc., to base what they say and do on those propositions. If the latter, suggest "Clearly, however, special revelation would be necessary to establish the truth of such propositions of Christianity as those on the nature of the person and work of Jesus Christ as do not fall into the category of general laws." If the former you will have to explain in some detail in what way I am to understand Christ and his doings as fundamental laws, whether general or special.
Theo : OK re eg, etc. Yes, I do mean what you've said in your paraphrase, and will consider amending the text accordingly.
1.9.1.1 The Thomist distinction between general & special revelation is valid (given a belief in revelation at all).
1.10 In summary, I assert that the world is perspicuous according to the following criteria :-
a). The world is open to investigation.
b). The world is as it appears to be.
c). There is nothing intrinsic to the way the world is constituted so as to discourage the pursuit of knowledge.
1.10.1 However, I agree that our knowledge of the world is limited by such criteria and cautionary maxims as those below :-
a). Because measurements disturb a system, certain pairs of quantities may not be knowable simultaneously at the quantum level.
Albert Dean : Its a bit nit-picking, but in fact uncertainty of indicated values at any given level means uncertainty of indicated values at every dependant level. And factoring effects mean the relative degree of uncertainty at any affected level need not be in scale with that at any other affected level.
IE: Tinkering at the atomic level with a pig or a duck might enable a flue virus to arise that slaughters us all.Theo : I'm simply speaking of Heisenberg's uncertainty principle here.
b). It is impossible for our knowledge of the world to be exhaustive.
c). Theories based on insufficient information are frequently false.
Albert Dean : Overall -
Albert Dean : I think the major improvement would be to make it clearer what supports the principle of openness and to state it in text book style, and say it is to be seen as a proposition that stands until it falls, in the sort of clear style that mathematical axioms are presented in.
Theo : I'm not sure how this principle could fall, once established. I suppose there have been times during paradigm shifts when people would have wondered whether they understood anything at all, but I think this is just a temporary loss of confidence.
Albert Dean : Then, the only substantial contradiction I can see is that with most of the piece you say we can adequately know the world without divine revelation, but, almost at the end, in 1.9.1, you suddenly say we need such revelation insofar as adequately knowing some unspecified information about Jesus and some unspecified other matters is concerned. If you wish to retain that you will have to go to 1.2 and make it clear that "world" does not include the relevant aspects of Jesus and those other matters.
Theo : I don't think this is a contradiction. If God is part of the world, then revelation would be part of the world too. I understand any "Special Revelation" to be part of the world like anything else, and have a chapter on its evaluation. If divine revelation is genuine, it is part of what makes the world intelligible and open to investigation. We merely have to determine whether it actually is revelation. This is a difficult task, but a first requirement is consistency with non-revelatory knowledge. What I'm saying is that we find things out (theoretically) in two ways - investigations of how things are by observation & experiment, and how things were by archaeological evidence and documentary evidence. Scripture is such a document. I also allow for God to break into the Universe (not into the world, which he is part of).
Albert Dean : Further to that, in 1.2 you say "world" includes God if existing. And with that it is obvious it would be ridiculous to say adequate understanding of the world need not include some understanding of God. But in the piece you give no explanation of how knowledge of God can be acquired without his divine revelation of himself. Thus, in effect you ask the visitor to believe knowledge of God can be obtained with the aid of a voltmeter.
Theo : I think I mean by special revelation God's (hypothetical) breaking into the world outside the general run of things by specific contingent acts. We need to know of such acts, which, if historical, could be based on archaeology or tradition, whether inscripturated or not. I think I need to clarify this in 1.9.1 and go easy on the "clearly".
Albert Dean : I think the problem began in that you attempted to do two things at the same time. Firstly, to say how adequate knowledge of the world can be obtained without divine revelation. Secondly, you layered on that a personal battle against the Witch Finder General; one is torn between white wale and windmill, it is done with such spirit and flare, beating between deep drama (J’accuse) and high comedy (Dem Bones).
Theo : I don't know what you mean.
Albert Dean : Remedy will of course do some damage to the main argument of the piece. But then, whilst little is actually wrong in what you say, I think it is not the way to tackle it. The first path requires no more than a simple list of instructions as per plastic kit. Whilst the argument between Alice and the Cat is presently in fact a game of chess where neither side has a king, science can produce no ultimate Object, theology can produce no ultimate Entity. Thus, checkmate is not possible. It is a struggle of deception and attrition, to be fought out in the mud between the shell holes and the wire, mainly in the dark, with absurd weapons and absurd objectives, and where the last to fall is wrong.
Theo : Ditto. I think I've lost your plot from now on.
Albert Dean : Finally, you do not seem to have fully utilised the point that we are between a veil and a brick wall, that it is surely enough a supportive God, assumed, denies us clear sight of the future, that there is no need he disguise what more we can see of the past.
Albert Dean : You might also care to consider including exploration of the possibility even major miss-deduction of the past may be trivial in comparison to minor miss-construction of the future.
Albert Dean : Phew! How many more sections to go. You can be assured they get shorter treatment!