COMMENSAL ISSUE 96

With reference to Frank Walker's C95 contribution, 'Of Homicide and Murder', I note your "uncertainty as to what sort of argument it was supposed to be." (C95/9). My own contribution on the same topic ('Murder and Persons' C94/8) is an interpretation grounded in the existential dilemma I refer to above. An entity with the capacity for reflexive awareness has a dual status as both subject and object. A ‘person' is an entity whose subjectivity has been acknowledged or admitted by some other such entity or group of entities. Murder, considered as a moral wrong, is only of persons. But how does this help Frank ? The men in U577 were human beings whose subjectivity (whose personhood) had been overridden by the necessities of war. Those necessities would never have arisen if a majority of the German people and their leaders had admitted the personhood of those who, in the event, became their victims. Any act of aggression by one group against another constitutes an implicit denial, by the first group, of the subjectivity of the individuals comprising the second group. If a third group then places the situation as a whole within the context of a conception of the person that embraces the second group, then the first group will be found guilty of crimes against humanity: the guilt is theirs.

"Why no more outlaws or lynch mobs?" you ask (C95/9). Because, either due to a general erosion of our collective sense (or senses) of identity, or due to a general broadening of the person-category, or both, it has become increasingly difficult for any group publicly to deny the personhood of the members of any other group e.g. racial minorities or criminals.

With reference to Kevin Arbuthnot's comments on morality and the Hierarchy of Needs (C95/16-17) I would remark as follows:

1. People who do not lack any of the "fundamental requirements" of life are nonetheless capable of doing some pretty nasty things to their fellow human beings, while people in desperate straits have shown altruism. I believe that the inclusion / exclusion of our fellows from the person-category is the decisive factor here.
2. I do not deny that we are all capable of anti-social acts, but Kevin's position seems to suggest that we are all subject to some sort of anti-social gravity, under the influence of which, unless buoyed up by the satisfaction of our needs, we will automatically sink into the depths of moral depravity. Now it is all, of course, a question of survival. But we are, of course, social animals. And so, 'if everyone behaved like that' there would, of course, be no social, and hence ultimately no individual survival. And so, to repeat the quote that concluded my last contribution, "the moral person... is the organ of a common reason".

The distortion in the development of individuals that results in anti-social behaviour can be traced, I believe, to the existential anxiety caused by the dichotomous status of the human individual. One way in which the human species has attempted to deal with this anxiety is through the subordination of the female sex, which has been scapegoated for the physicality - the object status - of our existence (which contradicts our subject-status: hence the anxiety). This subordination leads, in individual cases, to an exacerbated anxiety that a mother will unconsciously communicate to her child. The resultant chronic anxiety distorts the child's social development.

No system of morality is absolutely objective: it is not written in the sky. But, just as a fact is objective to the extent that individuals agree it to be the case, so a system of morality is objective to the extent that it serves the underlying purpose of morality: coherence among persons.

I am of course willing to discuss any of these topics, and others, at Braziers, but don't ask me to referee a debate (total incoherence would be the result!) and I don't feel qualified to deliver a talk on any particular subject.

Michael Nisbet

Michael : If this denial of personhood is the appropriate mental fiction to adopt to justify judicial killings, it is not the one that has been historically adopted, else why were the last rites (and other religious solace) given to criminals prior to execution ? What about the football in no-man’s land ? Hence, if this is a historical argument, it is false, whereas if it is an argument for the position we ought to adopt, it is doubtful. How can moral action be maintained by a fiction ? The people in U577 were just as much persons as Frank, which is Frank’s worry. The fact that they were on the "wrong" side has nothing to do with that. Surely the unease most of us would have with killing people, even in war, cannot be assuaged by pretending to ourselves that their personhood is in suspense. The justification, if there is one, is that in certain circumstances the killing of persons is right, or at least not as wrong as the alternatives. In war, it would be either the "just cause" argument (in so far as the individual can judge this at the time) or the "them or us" argument (in the nearer or wider context).

I think the euthanasia debate has a bearing on this. Those doctors who, openly or clandestinely, effect euthanasia do so, at great risk to themselves, for the very reason that they consider their patients to be persons whose personhood deserves respect. If they had to put themselves into the mind-set that their patients were not persons, there would be no point committing the illegal act, because no person would benefit from it.

I agree with you on your second point in response to Kevin - propensities to altruism are explained by our being social animals. A consequence of your following paragraph would be that we would expect women to be subordinated in precisely those societies in which the spiritual is valued over the physical. Can anyone think up some counter-examples ?

Your assertion that "a fact is objective to the extent that individuals agree it to be the case" will, I hope, spark an interesting debate. Gnomic utterances like this are obscure, and open to misinterpretation. I feel an irresistible urge to translate it as the extreme relativist assertion that "statements are true if a society agrees they are". I would tend to say that an objective fact is a true statement, and that it would be true even if no-one believed it to be the case, or had even heard of it. You may simply be saying that societies do decide what are to count as objective facts; not arbitrarily, but often wrongly, so that a statement at one time categorised as a fact subsequently turns out to be erroneous & is declassified.

I look forward to meeting you at Braziers & continuing the discussion !

Theo